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                                                                  “The Internet has no territorial boundaries.
                                                                      Not only is there perhaps ‘no there there’, the
                                                   ‘there’ is everywhere where there is Internet access.”1
I. Introduction
In modern times legal systems of many countries face challenges in adjusting their 
traditional institutions to the new reality of electronic commerce. One of the most 
promising technologies in this field is a system of automated communication in which 
electronic agents assist people in the trading process with no legal frameworks 
established in advance. This technology is much more advanced than the Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI) where prospective human trading partners enter “interchange 
agreements” with each other prior to the commencement of a trading. 
This paper will analyze the American and Polish approach to this matter and show 
how the two systems which originate from the same source, meaning, the UNCITRAL 
standards, treat the problems differently. 
The first chapter presents electronic agents and their historical development. It is 
followed by a discussion of the legal status of intelligent agents and their contractual 
capacities. Finally, the third and fourth chapters analyze the American and Polish laws 
governing electronic contracts, including contract formation, safety procedures and 
avoidance doctrines. After this debate one may decide whether the current legislation is 
ready for transactions concluded by electronic agents.
1 Digital Equipment Corporation v. Altavista Technology, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, (D. Mass.1997).
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A. Historical development of electronic agents
The notion of an electronic agent was established in the United States, a country 
where the artificial intelligence technology movement commenced. Famous research 
centers, such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Carnegie Mellon 
University (CMU), Stanford University and IBM have operated with this term since the 
mid-1950s. The earliest computer program operating as an electronic agent, called 
LogicTheorist, was developed at CMU and imitated the “human way of thinking.”2
The original task of electronic agents as tools, was to discover and count the 
number of Web servers. This was an important task since the rapidly increasing content 
of the Internet made it impossible to gather and process information by manual 
browsing.3
Electronic agents of the first generation, such as LogicTheorist, were only able to 
perform relatively easy tasks, such as searching and providing relevant information for 
their users. Later, in the 1980s they also could be programmed within the Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI) system to issue a standard offer and to both record and acknowledge 
acceptances from the trading partners. 
The classical search engines that belong to the first generation of electronic agents 
are divided into three categories. The first group is information search engines that gather 
information on the web, classify it following criteria generally determined by their users 
and display a list of links to related websites. The second category comprises the 
2 Emily M. Weitzenboeck, Electronic Agents and the Formation of Contracts, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 
OF LAW AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, Vol.9 No.3, 204-234 (2001).
3 H. G. Ruse, Electronic Agents and the Legal Protection of Non-creative Databases, INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF LAW AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY Vol.9 No.3, 295-326 (2001).
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directories and portals that contain a database of links to websites that have subscribed to 
an agreement with the concerned service provider. The last type is the specialized search 
engines that are directed to very specific topics such as ticket selling or gathering of press 
articles.4 The most common examples of search engines are: AltaVista, Google, Go, 
Lycos, Excite, Northern Light, FAST and Inktomi. In all those applications search 
engines do not act autonomously since the service provider controls the extent of the 
activities.
In today’s world search engines that only respond to requests for information are 
no longer sufficient, therefore, a second generation of electronic agents is being 
developed. These sophisticated electronic agents are capable of performing more 
complex actions that include tasks, such as initiating, negotiating and formatting 
contracts. To meet the high expectations of their users they possess human characteristics 
such as intelligence, creativity and pro-activeness. What distinguishes these intelligent 
agents from other electronic agents is that they have autonomy, meaning that besides the 
built-in knowledge they gain their own experience. This indicates that they can operate 
without the direct intervention of human beings or other agents, and have some degree of 
control over their actions and internal state.5 They are promising tools for electronic 
commerce and nowadays they are mostly used to assist buyers (BargainFinder, Kasbah6, 
Marketspace) and sellers (AgentWare).7 At the same time, however, the activities of 
4 A. Cruquenaire, Electronic Agents as Search Engines: Copyright related aspects, INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF LAW AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY Vol.9 No.3, 327-343 (2001).
5 Weitzenboeck, supra note 2.
6 For the purposes of this paper it is good to mention that in Kasbah the users can indicate beforehand 
whether the agents should ask approval of the user before finalizing the deal, or whether the agents can 
merely send e-mail notification when agreement is reached. 
7 A.R. Lodder & M.B. Voulon, Intelligent Agents and the Information Requirements of the Directives on 
Distance Selling and E-commerce, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW COMPUTERS & TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 
16, No. 3, 277-287, 2002.
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electronic agents raise legal questions of validity of contracts concluded with their help 
since there is no direct control of human users over independently acting electronic 
devices. 
B. Definition of an electronic agent
The widely accessible Internet has connected people from most parts of the world 
and created one uniform market. So far, however, a single, universally acceptable 
definition of an electronic agent has not been introduced. In literature many terms for 
electronic agents are used interchangeably; agents are called assistants, digital butlers8, 
intelligent software agents, intelligent bots, autonomous or mobile agents9, spiders, 
crawlers or web robots.10
Electronic agents are used in so many forms and for so many purposes that it is 
difficult to create one general definition. That is why Russell and Norvig, well-known 
scientists in the field of artificial intelligence,  defined electronic agents broadly as 
“anything that can be viewed as perceiving its environment through sensors and acting 
upon that environment through effectors.”11
Although, a global definition of an electronic agent does not exist, some countries 
have adopted their own definitions. For example, in the United States state and federal 
legislatures adopted a definition drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), which says that electronic agent means a computer 
8 HODDER & STROUGHTON , BEING DIGITAL 149 (1995).
9 S. R. Cross, Agency, Contract and Intelligent Software Agents, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW 
COMPUTERS & TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 17, No. 2, 175-189, July (2003).
10 Russe, supra note 3.
11 RUSSEL & NORVIG, quoted by Ruse, supra note 3. 
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program used independently to initiate an action or respond without review or action by 
an individual.12 Poland, following the trend in the European Union, has not defined 
electronic agents within its legal system.13
C. Characteristics of electronic agents
Although there is no widely accepted definition of the phrase “electronic agent”, 
certain characteristics of these agents can distinguish them from other computer 
programs. Scientists have enumerated these key elements as being: autonomy, social 
ability, reactivity and pro-activity. Autonomy means that the agent has the capacity to act 
without the intervention of its human or other user and thereby has some level of control 
over its activities and internal state. Social ability indicates that the agent has the ability 
to communicate with other agents and humans through a shared agent communication 
language. Reactivity implies that the agent is able to perceive an environment and 
respond in a timely fashion to changes that occur within it. The last characteristic, pro-
activeness, means that agents are able to demonstrate goal-directed activity by taking 
initiative.14
Agents that possess the abovementioned characteristics are within a weak notion 
of agency.15 There also is a strong notion of agency that requires an agent to have 
12 UETA § 2(6). 
13 Katarzyna Kryczka, Ready to join the EU Information Society? Implementation of E-commerce Directive 
2000/31/EC in the EU acceding countries – the example of Poland, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW 
AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 12 No.1, 55-73 (2004).
14 Cross, supra note 9, at 177.
15 The distinction between weak and strong notions of agency was introduced by Wooldridge and Jennings 
in “Intelligent agents: Theory and Practice”, available at http://www.elec.qmw.ac.uk/dai/pubs/KER95/.
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additional features, such as knowledge, belief, intention, obligation, mobility,16
veracity,17 benevolence18 and rationality19.20 In today’s world most electronic devices 
employed by the Internet users do not possess the above-mentioned characteristics. They 
are treated as mere tools because they are not capable of creating any legally binding 
relationships. For example, a worldwide known search engine “Google” is an automatic 
device that may be used only to search for specified terms. “Google” cannot be employed 
for any other purposes because it lacks autonomy, meaning that all its work is controlled 
by the human user. 
D. Classification of electronic agents
There are many different classifications of electronic agents presented in the 
literature and they are based on various factors, such as intelligence, mobility, 
interactivity, trustworthiness, etc.
Revelli divides electronic agents into several groups. The simplest are search 
information agents followed by watcher agents which track changes on the Internet as to 
specific information and areas of interest of the user. The last two are agents for e-
commerce such as shopping agents, like Shopper.com and assistant agents, a type of 
16 It is an ability to move around in an electronic network.
17 It is an assumption that an agent will not knowingly communicate false information.
18 It is an assumption that agents do not have conflicting goals, and that every agent will therefore always 
try to do what is asked of it.
19 It is an assumption that an agent will act in order to achieve its goals and not to prevent them.
20 Cross, supra note 9, at 178.
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desktop tool that organizes computer work such as filtering, deletion and response to 
received e-mails.21
Stuurman and Wijnands made a clear grouping of agents by arranging them into 
passive, active and transaction agents. According to the authors, passive agents relate to 
programs that function and interact within the user’s own environment. Active agents, on 
the other hand, actively gather and process information. Finally, transaction agents 
perform transactions for or with a consumer, an example being an agent that orders a 
book for a user on the basis of a consumer’s profile.22
In this paper close attention will be paid to the performance of transaction agents 
since only this category is able to conclude and perform legally binding contracts. 
Currently a great number of Internet retailers work with help of transaction agents, 
because their use speeds up transactions and decreases the cost of service. For instance, 
companies like “Expedia.com”or “Priceline.com” conclude contracts for sale of airplane 
tickets through electronic agents. Therefore, a customer who needs to purchase a plane 
ticket from Pittsburgh to Bologna must invite an electronic agent to make an offer by 
specifying the date and place of departure, as well as the place of destination. In response, 
the electronic agent usually makes several offers from which the customer may choose 
the one he favors. If the customer accepts the offer he likes a contract is concluded and 
almost simultaneously the confirmation of the agreement is sent to the customer’s 
mailbox. On the other hand, there are also situations in which it is the individual who 
makes an offer and an electronic agent’s response operates as the acceptance. For 
example, “Priceline.com” has an option in which it is the customer who specifies the date 
21 S. Gonzalo, A Business Outlook regarding Electronic Agents, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, Vol.9 No. 3, 189-203 (2001).
22 STUURMAN & WIJNANDS, quoted by Cross, supra note 9, at 176.
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and place of departure, destination and price of ticket he wishes to purchase. After 
sending his offer he waits for an electronic agent’s response. If the electronic agent 
accepts the customer’s offer a contract is formed, if the offer is rejected the customer may 
make another offer or ask for an offer from the electronic agent. There are also situations 
in which both parties are electronic agents acting on behalf of their users. In those cases 
electronic agents on a customers’ side may use the built-in knowledge of their users’ 
preferences and apply it during the negotiation process. One can imagine, a scenario in 
which an electronic agent “working” for a businessman buys a plane ticket for a specified 
seat, books a room in his favorite hotel and rents his ideal car. All those transactions seem 
to be simple, but in reality they may raise legal issues of contract formation, enforcement 
and liability for an electronic agent’s actions. The consequences of an intelligent agent’s 
behavior will also depend on its legal status and thus, three different legal solutions will 
be presented in order to decide which best fits the needs of the market and legal 
principles.         
II. Electronic agents in the eyes of law
It is beyond question that electronic agents are revolutionary and a promising tool 
for electronic commerce. However, many legal issues in regard to their contractual 
abilities are still pending since electronic agents of the second generation have appeared 
in electronic commerce just a few years ago. The technology of electronic agents also 
brings new considerations in the area Internet security, trust, privacy and consumer 
protection.
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A. Electronic agent as a mere communication tool
In order to resolve the issue of enforceability of contracts concluded by electronic 
agents some authors proposed considering intelligent agents as mere communication 
tools such as telephones or fax machines. In this approach anything emanating from the 
electronic agent is in fact to be construed as emanating from the legally capable party 
using the agent.23 The rationale for this theory is that people often sign contracts without 
reading them and those contracts are as binding as those which are thoroughly analyzed. 
To support this theory Tom Allen suggested that lawmakers can adopt a presumption that 
a person who employs electronic agent and relies on it expresses his or her intent to be 
bound by the computer device’s actions.24
Although the attribution rule solves the problem of enforceability this theory is 
not free from criticism. The biggest disadvantage of it is that it places a harsh burden on 
the user who has a limited control over the computer, which can initiate actions on its 
own.25 The user is responsible for the conduct of the electronic agent regardless of his 
knowledge as to the concluded contracts and their terms.26 On the other hand, one may 
say that this view gives a strong incentive to the user to ensure that the agent is properly 
operating and being adequately policed.
23 Cross, supra note 9, at 180.
24 Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?, 9 HARV. J.L.& TECH. 23, (1996).
25 This disadvantage was discussed by UNICITRAL when proposing the Convention on Electronic 
Contracting, but the committee finally decided that electronic agents should be considered mere 
instruments of communication- “The Data messages that are generated automatically by computers without 
human intervention should be regarded as “originating” from the legal entity on behalf of which the 
computer is operated.” 
26 Weitzenboeck, supra note 2, at 214.
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B. Electronic agent as an agent under the law of agency
A great deal of literature has also been dedicated to the governance of electronic 
agents by the law of agency. This topic has been discussed at length in the United States 
as well as in Europe since agency law has a potential to regulate the legal issues in 
automated transactions.
In the United States the most ardent supporter of the application of agency law to 
electronic agents is Fischer, who argues that the comparison seems obvious: 
                when computers are given the capacity to communicate with each 
other based upon preprogrammed instructions, and when they 
possess the physical capacity to execute agreements […] without 
any human awareness […] beyond the original programming of 
the computer’s instructions, these computers serve the same 
function as similarly instructed human agents of a party and thus 
should be treated under the law identically to those human 
agents.27
Fisher further argues that this approach is reasonable since the principles of 
agency law do not require an agent to have a contractual capacity28 in order to be 
competent to act as an agent.29 In order to avoid the requirement of acceptance of the 
agency mandate he proposes the adoption of legal fiction of consent.30 The author also 
emphasizes that the idea can be easily adopted in the United States since its law does not 
27 Fischer quoted by Jean-François Lerouge, The Use of Electronic Agents Questioned Under Contractual 
Law. Suggested Solutions on a European and American Level, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. 
L.403, (1999), also available at http://www.droit.fundp.ac.be/textes/lerouge2.pdf.
28 This argument fails under the Polish law since Article 100 of Civil Code requires that an agent has at 
least limited contractual capacity. In order to uphold this theory a legal fiction of contractual capacity 
would have to be established.
29 Cross, supra note 9, at 179.
30 Weitzenboeck, supra note 2, at 216.
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require any special formalities for the creation of the agency relationship.31 According to 
the Restatement 2d of Agency Law § 26 in order to establish an agency relationship the 
parties may have express, written or verbal agreement that determines the authority, 
duties and liability of the agent.32
There are, however, other legal issues that application of the law of agency cannot 
solve. The biggest concern is that agency law only applies to legal persons and only legal 
persons can make contracts. In order to overcome this obstacle, another commentator, 
Kerr, suggests that electronic devices are included within the set of rules that form the 
external law of agency since the disputes will only involve the principal and the third 
party engaged in the agent transaction.33 Kerr’s view, however, was challenged by an 
argument that the third party frequently has the right to choose to take action against the 
principal or agent. For example, this issue is raised by the doctrine of undisclosed 
principal. It says that whenever the agent acts in his own name without disclosing to the 
third party that he is acting as an agent, he is liable to the third contacting party, and the 
later disclosure of the existence and identity of the principal does not exclude the liability 
of the agent. In that scenario the agent is jointly and severally liable with the principal for 
the resulting damages.34
Kerr’s approach definitely has a flaw. It excludes issues from the internal agency 
relationship, meaning the one between the principal and the agent. As a result the 
principal would not have recourse against the agent in situations where the agent exceeds 
31 This argument also would fail under Polish law because Article 102 of Civil Code says that the 
agreement establishing agent-principal relationship must be in writing. Polish law sets up other formal 
obstacles, such as a requirement to return the agency document to the principal after the relationship 
expires.    
32 F. De Miglio et al., Electronic Agents and the Law of Agency, at 
http//www.cirfid.unibo.it/~agsw/lea02/pp/DemiglioOnidaRomanoSantoro.pdf.
33 Lerouge, supra note 27, at 8.
34 De Miglio, supra note 32.
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its authority or when it engages another incompetent agent. This means that the principal 
has the rights and duties in respect to third parties associated with an electronic agent 
transaction, but no parallel rights in respect to internal relations.35
The theory of application of agency law to electronic agents has been criticized 
for its complicated structure. It fails to explain issues at many levels and calls for too 
many exceptions to the rules of agency.36 According to scholars this theory fails because 
the law proposes simpler ways to reach the same result.37
C. Electronic agent as a legal person- ePerson
In the search for the best solutions scholars have also considered granting 
electronic agents legal personality. The justification for that proposal stems from a theory 
introduced by Lawrence Solum and is based on several factors. The first argument is that 
any entity, which has some characteristics in common with natural persons, such as self-
consciousness, is morally entitled to legal protection.38 This view, however, was 
criticized for its focus on a computer as an entity instead of on the protection of those 
who trade through the computer. The second reason for recognizing ePersons is that a 
sophisticated computer program may have social ability, meaning that people who 
interact electronically think that electronic agents are the source of communication, rather 
than their human users. It is therefore people’s perception of computer programs that 
35 Lerouge, supra note 27, at 9.
36 There are many other unresolved issues, such as the excess of authority, delegation of authority to 
another, unauthorized agents, ratification of agent’s acts.
37 De Miglio, supra note 32.
38 Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C.L.REV. 1231, (1992).
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determines whether they are something more then just mere instruments.39 The last 
argument for this solution is the legal and commercial convenience that comes from 
recognizing electronic agents as independent entities. The advocates of conferring legal 
personality to an electronic agent argue that this approach would solve the problem of 
electronic agents’ capacity to express consent and bear liability because the legal fiction 
would not be necessary at that point.40
An initial and direct effect of attributing legal personality to electronic agents is to 
grant them legal rights and obligations. In consequence electronic agents, as any other 
legal person, would be able to have assets, to sue and be sued. They basically would have 
all economic rights, except personal rights, which are reserved only for natural persons. 
It is argued in legal literature that it is still difficult to justify attributing legal 
personality to electronic agents on the basis of these arguments. The biggest concern is 
the difficulty of identifying the agent since it may not be clear whether it is the hardware 
or software.41 In the world of companies and corporations as legal entities, a system of 
registers solves this problem by identifying all legal persons, their names and addresses, 
thus giving companies’ standings for commercial purposes. 
As for electronic agents, Karnow proposed a system called the “Turing Registry”. 
The general idea is that the registry would issue certificates for anybody who plans to use 
39 It is possible that future generations will have a different attitude toward computers since on a daily basis 
they will be more dependent on electronic devices. Some scientists think that even at this level of 
development the status of computers may be confusing since people work and “socialize” with them. For 
example, such events as beating chess champion Kasparov made part of the society think that artificial 
intelligence is extremely advanced. Other computer games also have had a tremendous impact on 
perception of computers as everyday companions. The possibility of considering an electronic agent as a 
legal person was discussed in Official Comments to § 2(6) of UETA which say that if artificial intelligence 
developments offer autonomous agents the courts may construe the definition of electronic agent 
accordingly, in order to recognize such new capabilities. Finally, this future scenario of autonomous, 
instead of automated programs was also subject to discussion within UCITRAL. More information 
available at: www.uncitral.org/english/workinggroups/wg_ec/wp-104-add4-e.pdf.  
40 Allen, supra note 24, at 12.
41 Weitzenboeck, supra note 2, at 213.
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an electronic agent and would guarantee coverage for risks arising from its use. The 
measurement of premium would depend on the level of intelligence of an electronic 
agent. In other words, the more intelligent and autonomous the agent is, the greater the 
risk, and the higher the premium to be paid. According to its author, the “Turning 
Registry” would be mandatory for programmers and all those who plan to use 
autonomous electronic devices.42 However, many scholars think that this system does not 
solve completely the problem with identification and moreover, leads to extreme cost 
which is hard to justify at the current level of electronic agents’ development.43
It is obvious that the concept of an electronic person offers a crucial advantage 
over the other approaches since it allows for limiting the liability for the owner of the 
agent. In other words, the user would not be personally liable for an electronic agent’s 
actions, but just up to the amount of a premium paid. All the financial responsibility of an 
electronic agent would be covered from the assets of the electronic agent itself acting as a 
legal person. The contracting party also draws some advantage from that. The party can 
check the soundness of the agent in the register and thus adjust his decision to conclude 
the contract.
III. Regulation of electronic agents in the United States
The issue of electronic agents and their ability to make electronic contracts has 
been recognized by American lawmaking bodies since the late 1990s. The legislative 
movement in the United States has been influenced by the work of the United Nations 
42 De Miglio, supra note 32. 
43  Weitzenboeck, supra note 2, at 213.
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Commission on International Trade Law.44 The developing technologies of automated 
computer systems and subsequent legislation and its interpretation on the international 
level made American scholars45 revisit traditional common law theories of contract 
formation to allow contracts to be concluded without human intervention.46
So far, in the United States there are four primary acts that recognize and govern 
actions of intelligent agents. The first national effort at providing some uniform rules on 
electronic commerce was the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act promulgated in 
1999.47 UETA turned out to be a successful compilation of procedural law facilitating 
electronic contracts.48 Another work of the NCCUSL, the Uniform Computer Information 
Act, did not get such wide support. Since 1999 it has been approved only in two states, 
Maryland and Virginia, because it includes too many controversial solutions.  For 
example, the UCITA has adopted a layered contract approach, which was denied in some 
jurisdictions.49 Due to its narrow legislative approval the UCITA will not be analyzed in 
a great detail even though it provides comprehensive substantive law on electronic 
44 On December 16 1996 the UNCITRAL adopted the Model Law on Electronic Commerce in order to 
further the progressive harmonization and unification of electronic commerce. More information and the 
text of the Model Law is available at: www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/a51r162.htm.
45 Raymond Nimmer, Fred H. Miller, William J. Pierce, Amelia H. Boss, Patricia Brumfield Fry and many 
other authors on electronic commerce were the members of Drafting Committee on UCITA and UETA,
more is available at: www.nccusl.org.
46 A report from the forty second session of the UN General Assembly in Vienna in November 2003 titled 
“Legal aspects of electronic commerce, Electronic contracting: background information” states that the 
existing uniform law conventions and acts, such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods and Model Law on Electronic Commerce, do not preclude the use of automated 
systems. Although none of these acts regulates electronic agents specifically, the Model Law in article 
13(2)(b) sets out a rule that attributes data messages sent by an automated system to the originator, meaning 
the program user. More information is available at: www.uncitral.org/english/workinggroups/wg_ec/wp-
104-add4-e.pdf.
47 Summary completed by the Uniform Law Commissioners, available at: 
www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_summaries/uniformacts-s-ueta.asp. 
48 UETA has been adopted in all states except for New York and Illinois. UETA’s current status is 
available at: www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ueta.asp.
49 Because of the controversy UCITA was amended in 2000 and 2002, but so far those actions have not 
changed states’ reluctance to it. More information and the text of UCITA are available at: 
www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucita.asp
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commerce. Closer attention will be paid to the revised version of the UCC Article 2 
which also regulates electronic agents and their contractual capacities.50 On the federal 
level electronic commerce is governed by the Electronic Signatures in Global and 
National Commerce Act51 which is designed to ensure that an electronic contract is not 
“denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or 
electronic record was used in its formation.”52
Before these acts are analyzed it must be explained that E-Sign, UCITA, UETA, 
and the revised UCC are consistent statutes which merely differ in their approach to 
contract formation and validity. Their application will depend on the form and the subject 
of contract, as well as on the issue raised in the dispute. Consequently, UCC Article 2 
will govern sales of goods, meaning all things that are movable at the time of 
identification to a contract of sale.53 UETA, on the other hand, will apply to the 
procedural matters of electronic records and electronic signatures relating to a 
transaction.54 UCITA, where enacted, covers contracts in “computer information” 
50 According to Gregory E. Maggs, revision of Article 2 was unnecessary because state legislatures and the 
federal government already have stepped in with alternative legislation. He argues that UETA and E-SIGN 
each contain provisions designed to remove any doubt that electronic agents may form contracts. 
Moreover, the UETA commentary asserts that the UETA merely confirms that machines may act as agents.   
Gregory E. Maggs, The Waning Importance of Revisions to U.C.C. Article 2, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 595, 
(2003).
Also Linda Rusch analyzed amendments to UCC Article 2 and came to a conclusion that they might cause 
more uncertainty than uniformity in electronic commerce. Linda J. Rusch , Is the Saga of the Uniform 
Commercial Code Article 2 Revisions Over? A Brief Look at What NCCUSL Finally Approved, 6 DEL. L. 
REV. 41, (2003).
The revised version has been introduced in Kansas only and its text is available at 
www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucc22A03.asp.
51 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001 et seq.
52 Id. § 7001(a)(2).
53 UCC § 2-102 and § 2-103(1)(k).
54 Official comment to UETA § 3 states that the Act applies to transactions which parties have agreed to 
conduct electronically and that the term transaction should be interpreted broadly so UETA has the widest 
possible application consistent with its purpose of removing barriers to electronic commerce. 
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meaning agreements to create, modify, transfer, or license computer information.55 It will 
also govern hybrid contracts, if obtaining the computer information is the primary 
purpose of the deal.56
A. Definition of an electronic agent
UETA was the first act in the United States that defined an electronic agent and 
regulated its contractual capabilities in the world of the Internet. All the above mentioned 
acts followed the UETA approach and state that: “electronic agent means a computer 
program or an electronic or other automated means used independently to initiate an 
action or respond to electronic records or performances in whole or in part, without 
review or action by an individual.”57
B. Electronic contracts
The formation of an electronic agreement is a complex process and it engages several 
stages. First, an electronic agent has to search for the parties, then negotiate the terms, 
draft the agreement, and finally execute it. The involvement of an intelligent agent in this 
55 It means that UCITA covers contracts to license or buy software, contracts to create a computer program, 
contracts for multimedia products, computer games, online access to databases, contracts to distribute 
information on the Internet, develop websites, and the like. UCITA does not apply to traditional books 
(only online books, magazines, newspapers), television sets, cars, furniture and the like, because those 
contracts are governed by Article 2 and 2A of the UCC.
56 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, UNDERSTANDING ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING UCITA, E-SIGNATURE, FEDERAL, 
STATE AND FOREIGN REGULATIONS (2001).
57 UETA § 2(6). The same definition was adopted in revised UCC § 2-103(1)(g). E-SIGN § 7006(3) adds 
“without review or action by an individual at the time of the action or response”, but official comments to 
UCC’s definition state that the two definitions are consistent. Finally, the UCITA § 102(a)(27) definition of 
“electronic agent” follows the UETA language, but at the same time clarifies that an electronic agent 
performs “on the person’s behalf”, meaning that all automated actions are attributed to a person using the 
program.  
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process raises many legal questions that affect the validity of a contract. This paper will 
analyze the American approach to the key issues in this matter, such as an electronic 
manifestation of intent, attribution of electronic agent’s actions and avoidance doctrines. 
Finally some cases touching the problem of attribution will be presented. 
1. Objective theory of assent
The general rule of American contract law says that a contract is concluded if there is
mutual assent, an intention from both parties to be legally bound, and consideration.58 In 
determining whether there is “meeting of minds” the American doctrine adopted an 
objective theory of assent and the standard of a reasonable person. It means that a party’s 
mental assent is not necessary to make a contract; the real but unexpressed state of mind 
is irrelevant. It is, hence, enough that the other party had reason to believe that the first 
party had the intention to agree.59 This objective theory allows electronic agents to be 
used in a contract conclusion process and to infer contractual intent from the 
programming and use of electronic devices.60
Interestingly, the UCITA, unlike any other statue, defines the contractual notion of a 
"manifestation of assent" in the context of electronic commerce. Section 112(b) stipulates 
that an electronic agent manifests assent on behalf of the person using it if, "after having 
58 I. Kafeza at al, Legal Issues in Agents for Electronic Contracting, at 
http://csdl.computer.org/comp/proceedings/hicss/2005/2268/05/22680134a.pdf.
59 Lerouge, supra note 27, at 19.
60 Patricia Brumfield Fry, Introduction to the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act: Principles, Policies 
and Provisions, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 237 (2001).
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an opportunity to review”61 a record or term, the electronic agent authenticates it or 
"engages in operations that indicate acceptance."62 The consequence of this provision is 
significant because it clarifies that an electronic agent is capable of manifesting its user’s 
assent and, thus, has the power to conclude contracts.63 In result, if a party shows that a 
robot has engaged in specific conduct to access information and obtained or used this 
information, the party will prove that there was assent and consequently a binding
contract.64
The current and revised UCC does not include a provision on manifestation of assent, 
but the amended version prevents a party from claiming a lack of contractual intent when 
electronic agents have interacted to form a contract without human intervention.65 Section 
2-212 specifically validates any action performed by an electronic agent by attributing 
such action to the parties.66 Under the current version contracts concluded through 
electronic agents may also be valid and attributed to an electronic agent user since in 
matters not governed by the UCC the UETA will step in and validate an electronic 
contract.67 The theory behind this approach is that an electronic record or signature is not 
61 According to § 112(e)(2) a website provides an electronic agent with the opportunity to review a contract
if it makes it available in a manner that a reasonably configured electronic agent would react to. Therefore, 
placing the contractual terms of a robot restriction agreement within the robot exclusion header would 
notify a reasonably configured robot of the website's policy. Jeffrey M. Rosenfeld, Spiders and Crawlers 
and Bots, Oh My: The Economic Efficiency and Public Policy of Online Contracts that Restrict Data 
Collection, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3.
62 UCITA § 112(b).
63 Ian R. Kerr , Spirits in the Material World: Intelligent Agents as Intermediaries in Electronic Commerce, 
22 DALHOUSIE L.J. 190, 231 (1999). The author further argues that this section should be rewritten to 
indicate clearly that the manifestation of a person's assent is sometimes made through an electronic agent, 
though never by an electronic agent.
64 Rosenfeld, supra note 61.
65 Juanda Lowder Daniel, Electronic Contracting under the 2003 Revisions to Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code: Clarification or Chaos?, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 319 (2004).
66 UCC § 2-212 says that an electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the 
act of the person or the person’s electronic agent or the person is otherwise legally bound by the act.
67 The UETA does not include attribution rule that mentions directly electronic agents, but it provides a 
general rule that attributes an electronic record to a party that uses electronic means of communication, 
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ascribed to a machine, but to the person operating or programming the machine just like 
the person would do it in a paper medium.68
2. Battle of the forms in automated transactions
Revised UCC, UCITA and UETA recognize contracts formed by the interaction of 
electronic agents acting without human intervention.69 They also recognize contracts 
formed by the interaction of an electronic agent and an individual acting on his own 
behalf or the behalf of another person.70 It is easy to imagine that at the negotiation stage 
parties will exchange their terms and a “battle of forms” is likely to occur. In this 
situation the revised UCC provides a “knock-out rule” which results in incorporating only 
those terms on which both parties agreed.71  The UCC, however, makes an exception to 
the general rule and, under some conditions, protects a user of an electronic agent when it 
interacts with an individual. Section 2-204(4)(b) states that an individual interacting with 
an electronic agent will be deemed to accept an offer of the agent if the individual takes 
an action that he can refuse to take and that he has reason to know (1) will indicate 
acceptance to the electronic agent, and (2) cause the agent to perform or provide benefits 
that are the subject of the contract. The contract, so formed, will not include any terms or 
UETA § 14. Valerie Watnick, The Electronic Formation of Contracts and the Common Law "Mailbox 
Rule", 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 175 (2004). 
A problem with attribution may arise in legislations that have not adopted the UETA (New York and 
Illinois). However, Register.com v. Verio, decided according to the New York law and discussed in detail 
later, shows that it may not be the issue and that general rules are sufficient.
68 Official Comments 2 and 3 to the amended UCC 2-212. 
69 UCC § 2-204(4)(a), UETA § 14(1) and similar provision in UCITA § 206(a). This provision, along with 
§ 2-207 has been criticized for eliminating parties’ true intent since the non-matching terms will be 
knocked out and just the terms that appear in the record of both parties will govern. 
70 UCC § 2-204(4)(b), UETA § 14(2) and UCITA § 206(b).
71 UCC § 2-207.
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expressions made by the individual (i.e. counter-offer) if the individual has reason to 
know the electronic agent cannot react to such terms.72
C. Avoidance doctrines
In a world of electronic transactions some changes or errors may be introduced into 
an electronic record, either because of system or transmission problems, or intentional 
human alteration. As a consequence difficult questions of liability of service providers 
and the rights and obligations of the parties arise and can result in costly litigation. The
Drafting Committee of the UETA noticed this problem and was concerned about the ease 
with which errors by individuals could be made, for example by hitting the "enter" key 
twice or mistyping a letter or number. Another concern was that, in transactions with 
automated agents, individuals would have less ability to correct errors than in 
transactions with other individuals since electronic communication is almost 
instantaneous.73
These concerns have been so pervasive that the UETA has two basic principles in
Section 10 applicable to the errors in automated transactions.74 The first permits parties to 
agree on a “security procedure” that detects changes or errors in electronic records and 
notifies the parties accordingly. For example, parties may agree to employ extra software 
that supervises whether the terms are somehow non-matching and automatically sends an 
e-mail to the negotiating parties in order to put them on notice of any errors or changes. A 
72 UCC § 2-211 is based on Section 206(c) of the UCITA.
73 Amelia H. Boss, The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act in a Global Environment, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 
275 (2001).
74 UCITA § 213(d) also provides regulation on effect of change or error.
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“security procedure” may also apply automatically, an example being a procedure of 
contract formation adopted by “Priceline.com.” When a person wants to buy a round-trip 
plane ticket to Bologna and chooses a date of departure for April 17, 2005 and date of 
returning for April 15, 2005, Priceline will notify the customer that the date of returning 
is scheduled two day earlier than departure. If parties adopt such a procedure a 
nonconforming party loses the right to avoid the effect of the changed or erroneous 
electronic record.75 Therefore, if the customer ignores the warning and purses the 
purchase he is not entitled to get away from this deal. It should be noted however, that an 
individual that does not qualify for this special provision is not automatically bound by an 
erroneous order because he may invoke other laws, such as the law of mistake, to try and 
undo the order. 
In instances where an error prevention or error correction procedure has not been 
agreed to, the UETA § 10(2) entitles a party to avoid a transaction that involves an error. 
This right arises when an electronic agent has not allowed for the prevention or correction 
of an error, but is subject to several conditions. First, on learning that the other party 
believed a transaction had occurred, the individual must give prompt notice of the error 
and that he or she did not intend to be bound. In addition, the individual may not have 
used or received the benefit of the transaction. Finally, the individual must take 
reasonable steps to return any consideration received as a result of the transaction, 
including compliance with any reasonable instructions given by the other party for return 
or destruction of the item.76 Analyzing the scenario of buying a plane ticket to Bologna 
75 THOMAS J. SMEDINGHOFF, Creating enforceable electronic transactions,  in RAYMOND T. NIMMER, 
UNDERSTANDING ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING UCITA, E-SIGNATURE, FEDERAL, STATE AND FOREIGN 
REGULATIONS, 85 (2001).  
76 Fry, supra note 60, at 242.
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the customer would be entitled to avoid contract if a “security procedure” was not 
available and he noticed the wrong dates but did not have an opportunity to correct the 
error before a contract was formed. Additionally, in order to avoid the deal he would 
have to follow all the above-mentioned instructions and return any consideration 
received.  
The goal of these provisions is to encourage Internet retailers and others designing 
web commerce systems to provide purchasers with the opportunity to review and confirm 
their order before the order is placed, and in this way to avoid the high cost of possible 
litigation.77 Such procedures are easily provided, for example, through the use of 
"confirmation screens" where the individual is asked to confirm the terms of the 
transaction. For instance, Priceline’s electronic agent demands customers to confirm the 
terms of contract before it moves to the final step of charging the customer’s credit card. 
By providing an opportunity for an individual to verify and confirm the information 
initially sent, the other party can eliminate the possibility of the individual defending on 
the grounds of inadvertent error since the electronic agent, through confirmation, allowed 
for correction of the error.78
The UCITA also contains similar rules of avoidance79, but in addition clarifies that a 
court may grant appropriate relief if the operations resulted from fraud, electronic 
mistake, or the like.80 Another difference is that it distinguishes merchants and consumers 
awarding those security procedures to consumers only. 
77 Stephen T. Middlebrook & John Muller, Thoughts on Bots: The Emerging Law of Electronic Agents, 56 
BUS.LAW. 341 (2000).
78 Boss, supra note 73, at 281.
79 UCITA § 214.
80 UCITA § 206. This section has been criticized from using a term of „electronic mistake” that has been 
nowhere defined. Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Symposium on Approaching E-commerce through Uniform 
24
In electronic transactions claims of lack of capacity, undue influence and duress 
probably will not arise because, first of all, electronic agents, so far, do not have 
contractual capacity and, secondly, it is hard to imagine a situation in which a contracting 
party is physically compelled or threatened.81 Official comments discuss defenses of 
fraud and mistake as possible claims, but at the same time caution courts not to approach 
such defenses with the same legal standards applicable to non-electronic transactions.82
A fraud claim is naturally hard to prove in the electronic world since it requires 
demonstration that an intentional or material misrepresentation induced a party to assent 
to a contract. A misrepresented party may encounter practical obstacles in showing intent 
to defraud if there is no evidence that at the time of contracting the other party 
misrepresented the truth or concealed material fact in order to induce another to act to his 
or her detriment. Another obstacle is the scholars’ reluctance the rule that the actions, 
intent and knowledge of an electronic agent are attributed to a computer user. In their 
opinion this strict attribution rule is unjust and may impair development of electronic 
agents.83 Therefore, the doctrine of fraud seems not to be a good claim unless a party 
proves that the deceptive conduct occurred at the programming stage.84
The doctrine of mistake also brings many questions that will need to be answered by 
courts. For example, it is uncertain whether an electronic agent can have “beliefs” and 
under what circumstances a party that employs an electronic agent will bear the risk of 
mistake. Scholars also assume that mistake will not be a good basis for relief since a 
Legislation: Understanding the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act and the Uniform 
Electronic Transactions Act: Uniform Rules for Internet Information Transactions: An Overview of 
Proposed UCITA, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 319 (2000).
81 Daniel, supra note 65, at 323.
82 UCC § 2-204, cmt.6.
83 Daniel, supra note 65, at 324.
84 Id.
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party holds a heavy burden of proof85 and an attribution rule works against an electronic 
agent’s user. Some authors suggest that in order to make this claim available for parties 
employing electronic agents the rules have to be modified since traditional contract law is 
unsympathetic to claims of mistake.86
Finally, a party may invoke the doctrine of unconscionability in order to 
invalidate the whole contract or particular terms, but this will also bring evidentiary 
difficulties. Furthermore, the Official Comments to the UCITA say that the 
unconscionability doctrine will apply only to a procedural breakdown in the automated 
contracting process and it is not clear why breakdowns in the process would lead to 
"unconscionable" transactions.87
D. Case law on electronic agents
The case law on electronic agents is scarce since electronic commerce is a new 
area of law and unfortunately many cases that potentially would solve important issues 
are settled. The litigation focuses on tort claims rather than contractual matters involving 
electronic agents and has not much value for the purposes of this analysis. From the 
contract law point of view, so far, the courts have heard only a few cases involving 
electronic agents and have focused on the issue of attribution. In order to show that 
similar situations may be treated differently on an international level, besides the 
American cases one German court decision will be presented.  
85 For example in case of unilateral mistake a party must show that the mistake was material, it referred to 
basic assumption of fact and it results in unconscionability or that the other party knew it or caused it. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153.   
86 MANN & WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (2005).
87 Kerr , supra note 63.
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The first American case involving an automated system of communication was 
Corinthian Pharmaceutical Systems, Inc. v. Lederle Laboratories88 where the court 
decided that the response of the seller’s computer and issuance of a tracking number for a 
purchase order did not amount to an acceptance of the buyer’s offer. The court reasoned 
that the telephone computer ordering system performed automated and ministerial acts 
that could not constitute an acceptance.89 A commentary argued that the result could have 
been different if the seller employed a more sophisticated system that verified the identity 
of the orderer, checked the inventory level, allocated a portion of the inventory to 
fulfilling the order, and then issued the order tracking number. It still would be an 
automated system, but it might be in both parties' interests to consider it a legal 
acceptance.90
On the other hand, a German court deliberating on a similar case on attribution 
decided differently. The case involved a sale of goods erroneously offered by an 
automated system over the Internet for a price below the price intended by the seller. The 
electronic agent generated automatic replies from the seller saying that the customer’s 
“order” would be immediately “carried out”. The court stated that automated 
communications were attributable to the person on whose behalf the system has been 
programmed and in whose names the messages were sent. The critical point in the 
opinion that distinguishes this case from the Corinthian Pharmaceutical is that the court 
88 724 F. Supp. 605 (S. D. Ind. 1989).
89 Id.
90 D. M. Cameron et al, Electronic Contract Formation, at www.jurisdiction.com/ecom3.htm.
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recognized the messages sent by the automatic reply system as binding expressions of 
intention and a valid acceptance for the purposes of contract formation.91
Another case that touches the issue of the attribution rule is Register.com, Inc. v. 
Verio, Inc.92 Register involved an action for breach of contract, trespass to chattels93 and 
injunction filed by a registrar of Internet domain names attempting to bar defendant, a 
competitor and provider of Internet services, from using an electronic agent to access and 
collect contact information contained in the plaintiff’s database and from using that 
database for mass marketing purposes.94 Plaintiff argued that the defendant violated the 
terms of their agreement, which allowed public access to the plaintiff’s consumers’ 
contact information, but not for any mass-market purpose. Register.com further argued 
that the use of automated software to access and collect information from the database 
violated the terms of contract and harmed the plaintiff’s computer system. Verio raised in 
defense that even if Register.com’s terms of use were enforceable, Verio had not 
manifested any assent to those terms because it had never been asked to click on an 
“accept” icon and never received legally enforceable notice of the conditions Register 
intended to impose95. The court in response to this stated: 
Verio’s argument might well be persuasive if its queries addressed to 
Register’s computers had been sporadic and infrequent. If Verio had 
submitted only one query, or even if it had submitted only a few sporadic 
queries, that would give considerable force to its contention that it 
91 Report from the forty second session of the UN General Assembly in Vienna in November 2003 says that 
other German courts decided similar matter of electronic agent’ error differently and that this discrepancy 
stems from conflicting views regarding the allocation of risks. More information available at: 
www.uncitral.org/english/workinggroups/wg_ec/wp-104-add4-e.pdf. 
92 356 F.3d 393, 2004.
93 More on trespass to chattels by computer software and liability of act of electronic agent read 107 
A.L.R.5th 549, Marjorie A. Shields, J.D., Applicability of Common-law Trespass Actions to Electronic 
Communications. 




obtained the WHOIS96 data without being conscious that Register 
intended to impose conditions, and without being deemed to have 
accepted Register’s conditions. But Verio was daily submitting numerous 
queries, each of which resulted in its receiving notice of the terms Register 
exacted97. 
The court basically stated that Verio could not simply “ignore” the terms on the basis that 
it did not see them since Verio’s search engine was employed to collect information from 
the database98. The court rejected defendant’s contention that it did not form a contract 
with Register when its search robot collected information from the database. The court 
decided that Verio objectively demonstrated its assent to be bound by the Register’s 
terms through its conduct, meaning subsequent inquires while aware of the proposed 
terms. The court, therefore, attributed the search robot’s actions to Verio and held it liable 
for breach of contract.
IV. Electronic agents under Polish law 
Electronic commerce in Poland, and generally in the European Union, has not 
reached as high a level as in the United States. European legislatures, however, 
recognized the increasing role of the Internet, as well as new means of communication, 
96 Definitions of WHOIS and many other technical devices are included in judge Parker’s opinion attached 
as an Appendix since he died during the litigation of this case. WHOIS is a database which is a telephone 
book, like listing of various Internet addresses and their holder. 
97 Id.
98 In general, the process worked as follows: each day Verio downloaded a list of all currently registered 
domain names of all registrars and then, using a computer program, isolated the domain names that had 
been registered in the last day and the names that had been removed. Only then was a search robot used to 
query the database to extract the name of the accredited registrar of each new name. That search robot then 
automatically made successive queries to harvest the relevant contact information. Once retrieved, the 
WHOIS data was deposited into an information database maintained by Verio and used by Verio’s 
telemarketing staff.
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and made certain changes in traditional contracting law to bridge the gap between 
contracts and technology.
The Polish law of electronic commerce underwent major transformation when the 
Civil Code was amended and the European Union Directive on Electronic Commerce99
took effect.100 The rules on electronic contracting were also influenced by the EU 
Directive on distance selling,101 the UNCITRAL Model Law,102 the Principles of 
European Contract Law103 and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts.104
A. The Electronic commerce Directive
The E-commerce Directive has, so far, been the most extensive legal act on electronic 
contracting even though, just like the E-Sign and UETA, it is largely procedural and does 
not establish any substantive rules of European law.105
Article 9(1) of the E-commerce Directive clarifies, however, that 
      the Member States shall ensure that their legal system allows contracts to 
be concluded by electronic means [and] that the legal requirements 
applicable to the contractual process neither create obstacles for the use of 
electronic contracts nor result in such contracts being deprived of legal 
effectiveness and validity on account of their having been made by 
electronic means.106
99 EU Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market. O.J.L. 
178, 17.07.2000.
100 PAWEŁ PODRECKI, PRAWO INTERNETU, [INTERNET LAW] 2004. 
101 EU Directive 97/7 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts.
102 Available at www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm.
103 Available at www.cbs.dk/departments/law/staff/ol/commision_on_ecl/index.html.
104 Available at www.unidroit.org.
105 Aristotle G. Mirzaian, Esq., Electronic Commerce: This is Not Your Father's Oldsmobile, 26 RUTGERS 
L. REC. 7, (2002).
106 Article 9(1) of the E-commerce Directive.
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The explanatory notes of the proposal of the E-commerce Directive mention the use 
of electronic agents and say that “the Member States will have to:[…] not prevent the use 
of certain electronic systems as intelligent electronic agents.” However, the “electronic 
agent” regulation appeared in neither the recitals nor in the Articles of the Directive and 
the legislative history does not explain why drafters avoided this provision. 107
Scholars have been debating whether a contract concluded by an electronic agent 
would fall within the scope of the above-cited Article 9(1) and Article 11 which governs 
electronic contract formation. A strict interpretation of Article 11 may be that it does not 
allow an automatic electronic response since the language used in the provisions refers to 
“a recipient” and “his consent”, both of which suggest a human rather than an electronic 
agent.108
On the other hand, it could also be argued that there is no express exclusion in the 
Directive which precludes “a recipient” from being an electronic agent and the denial of 
contracts concluded by autonomous systems is in direct conflict with the central ethos109
of this act.110 This approach has been accepted by the majority, including Polish scholars, 
because it promotes the development of electronic commerce and complies with 
international standards.111
107 COM (1998) 586 final, p.25. Legislative history available at: 
www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/ecommerce/index.htm and at: 
www.europa.eu.int.scadplus/leg/en/lvb/124202.htm. 
108 Jim Groom, Are ‘Agent’ Exclusion Clauses a Legitimate Application of the EU Database Directive?, at 
www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrb/script-ed/docs/agents.doc.
109 The preamble states that the purpose of the Directive is to stimulate economic growth, competitiveness 
and investment by removing the many legal obstacles to the internal market in online provision of 
electronic commerce services.
110 Mirzaian, supra note 105.
111 It has been mentioned in the beginning that both the CISG and Model Law on Electronic Commerce are 
interpreted in a way that allows the use of electronic agents. 
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B. Contracts concluded by electronic agents 
It is obvious that legal recognition of electronic agents brings great opportunities for 
Polish businesses since such recognition may facilitate services and decrease the cost of 
transactions. There is, however, one more aspect of electronic agents that has great 
impact on the Polish legal system; they may influence the evolution of or even cause a 
revolution in the legal doctrines on manifestation of assent.
1. Subjective theory of assent
Until now Polish doctrine has supported a subjective theory of assent which 
distinguishes an act of will from its manifestation. Awareness of a person manifesting 
intent determines interpretation of his will and an understanding of a reasonable 
addressee of that statement is irrelevant.112 Under the subjective theory it is not certain 
whether communication made through electronic agents is an expression of will at all 
since the act of a person’s will is separated from its manifestation.113 It seems that the 
subjective theory is unacceptable because it requires awareness of the author of a 
communication, which is impossible in pre-programmed systems.114 A number of Polish 
scholars have been calling for objectification of interpretation of will since the 1970s, 
because it allows progress in commerce and promotes development of modern 
112 B. Pabin, Elektroniczne oswiadczenie woli w zarysie, e-Biuletyn 1/2004, available at: 
http://cbke.prawo.uni.wroc.pl/publikacje/ebiuletyn/biuletyn_1_2004/el_osw_woli1.htm. 
113 ANDRZEJ STOSIO, UMOWY ZAWIERANE PRZEZ INTERNET, [CONTRACTS CONCLUDED THROUGH THE 
INTERNET] 75 (2002).
114 Filip Wejman, Wprowadzenie do cywilistycznej problematyki ustawy o podpisie elektronicznym
[Introduction to civil issues of the Electronic Signature Act], PB 2002, no 2 at 41.
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technologies. Thanks to modern trends in legal doctrine it looks that they may finally 
succeed in their struggle115. 
Poland is not the only country that encountered similar problems. In Germany 
judges debated on the same issue and finally an expression of will made automatically 
was accepted as an expression in blanco which is based on an objective theory of reliance 
(Rechtscheinhaftung). According to the theory of the in blanco manifestation, one person 
signs a blank form leaving the blanks for another person to fill out and all further 
communications are attributed to the person who originally signed the form.116 The 
German argument has been adopted, with some exceptions, by Polish doctrine, because it 
solves a problem of manifestation of will and attribution of a message to a person who 
uses an electronic agent.117
2. Amendments to the Civil Code
Polish law does not define or mention electronic agents, but their recognition as 
mere communication tools118 is justified in the Civil Code and the Electronic Signature 
Act. It is commonly agreed that the amended Article 60 of the Civil Code gives legal 
effect to contracts concluded by electronic agents. The new version of Article 60 says 
that the will of a person may be expressed by any behavior sufficient to show intent, 
115 The leading Polish scholars, Gwiazdomorski and Radwański are great supporters of objectification of 
theory of assent. They suggest that interpreting a will one shall consider all circumstances, customs and 
good will of both parties instead of just internal will and knowledge. WOJCIECH KOCOT, OŚWIADCZENIA 
WOLI SKŁADANE INDYWIDUALNYM ADRESATOM NA NOŚNIKACH ELEKTRONICZNYCH, [ELECTRONIC 
EXPRESSION OF WILL MADE TO INDIVIDUAL ADDRESSEES] 52 (2005).
116 KOCOT, supra note 115, at 71.
117 STOSIO, supra note 113.
118 Theorists, however, do not exclude the possibility that messages of electronic agents will be attributed to 
themselves instead of to their users. Id. at 89.
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including an expression of will by electronic means.119 However, this amendment has 
been widely criticized as totally unnecessary.120 According to the majority of scholars the 
old version of the Civil Code provision was broad enough to include an electronic 
expression of will. In their opinion it does not matter whether contracting parties use the 
Internet in a traditional way, such as a telephone, telex or telefax where a person directly 
expresses his will, or in an automated way through an electronic agent since it is assumed 
that the message generated and sent by a computer comes from a person that uses the 
computer.121
Some authors, on the other hand, point out that the ratio legis of Article 8 of the 
Electronic Signature Act and the amendment of Article 60 is a positive assurance that an 
electronic expression of will results in legal consequences and eliminates possible claims 
that a contract concluded electronically is invalid.122
Another amendment that changed traditional contracting rules was an adaptation 
of Article 61 § 2 which states: “Expression of will made in an electronic form is effective 
towards the other person at the moment it has been posted on the service provider and its 
text is available to that person.” This provision is significant because it modified a deeply 
rooted receipt rule characteristic in many European legal systems.123 It derogates from the 
119 Article 60 of the Civil Code was amended by the Electronic Signature Act of 2001 and is based on 
Article 5 of the Model Law which says: “Information shall not be denied legal effect, validity or 
enforceability solely on the grounds that it is in the form of a data message.”
120 Transactions performed by electronic means have been recognized in several acts from 1997, for 
example in art.7a of the law on public transactions of financial instruments, art.7 of banking law, art. 26b of 
the Act on Investment Funds and art.51(5) of the Act on commodity exchange. Wojciech Kocot, 
Elektroniczna forma oświadczenia woli [Electronic form of expression of will], Przegląd Prawa 
Handlowego, March 2003.
121 Dawid Kot, Zawarcie umowy za pomocą elektronicznych środków porozumiewania się na odleglość, 
[Conclusion of contract by electronic means of communication on distance] 2002.
122 Ewa Wyrozumska, Elektroniczne oświadczenie woli w ustawie o podpisie elektronicznym i po 
nowelizacji kodeksu cywilnego, [Electronic expression of will in the Electronic Signature Act and after the 
amendment of the Civil Code],  Przegląd Prawa Handlowego, August 2003.
123 KOCOT, supra note 115, at 21-29.
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general rule that an expression of will takes legal effect when it reaches an addressee in a 
way he can know its content.124 The requirement of receipt in electronic contracting is 
now met when a message is available on the server so the addressee can read it even 
though it has yet not been opened or processed. Consequently, a contract is concluded at 
the time the expression of will is made available for the other party.125 This rule was 
confirmed by the Supreme Court of Poland, the Civil Division in December 2003.126 The 
case before the court involved an order for a money transfer that was made electronically 
on the last day of the payment period. The plaintiff claimed that even though an 
electronic order was made on time the defendant was late with the payment because the 
money was transferred one day after the due date. The court disagreed with the plaintiff 
and concluded that the electronic transfer of money became effective not when a bank 
actually processed the transaction, but when the electronic order for the money transfer
was received and the bank had the necessary information available to finish the 
transaction.127
Scholars consider this amendment a good step in the facilitation of electronic 
commerce. At the same time they criticize the legislators for not adopting special rules on 
electronic revocation of will since these traditional rules do not comply with the fast 
communication provided by the Internet and therefore can make a revocation simply 
impossible.128
124 Civil Code Art.61 § 1.
125 KOCOT, supra note 115, at 110. 
126 Sad Najwyzszy, Izba Cywilna [Supreme Court, Civil Division] V CZ 127/03.
127 Orzecznictwo Sadu Najwyzszego [Decisions of the Supreme Court] 2005, no 1, at 71-75.
128 Article 61 § 1 in fine says that a revocation of an expression of will is effective if it reaches an addressee 
at the time of manifestation or before it. In electronic communication, which is almost as fast as a 
telephone, it is hard to meet this condition.     
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Another important provision on electronic contract formation is Article 66¹ § 1 
which says that an offer made in an electronic form is binding upon the offeror if an 
offeree immediately confirms its receipt.129 The confirmation requirement is an additional 
element conditioning valid contract formation and is based on Article 11.1 of the E-
commerce Directive.130   This requirement protects consumers who may assume that they 
are not bound by their offer until the other party confirmed that it received it.131 The rule 
also protects offerees who get an assurance that the offer is binding upon the offeror. If 
an offeree wants to conclude a contract he must immediately confirm receipt of the offer, 
which does not amount to an acceptance. After having met this requirement the offeree 
may accept or reject the offer. This confirmation may be made in any manner (by any 
behavior) sufficient to show intent to confirm, but traditional mail may not be effective 
since it may not meet the requirement of “immediate response”. In practice both
confirmation and acceptance can be done at the same time so the communication is not 
delayed. Therefore, under the Polish law a customer wishing to purchase a plane ticket to 
Bologna would have to immediately respond to Priceline’s offer in order to preserve his 
right to accept that offer. On the other hand, if the customer were the offeror he would be 
bound by his offer only if  Priceline’s electronic agent confirmed that it received the 
offer. It is clear that this way of contracting may delay some transactions, especially those 
which are made through the exchange of electronic mail since an offeree can often read 
his mail hours and even days after the message arrives at his mailbox.  
129 The Civil Code distinguishes procedures applicable to electronic and non-electronic contracting.
130 The Drafting Committee of NCCUSL decided to delete the provision on acknowledgment of receipt 
from UETA, reaching the conclusion that the adoption of such a provision would be contrary to the 
fundamental principles of the UETA: to retain the flexibility necessary to allow for the development of new 
commercial practices and new technological implementations. Boss, supra note 70.
131 Moreover, it is considered a better and generally less complicated method of protection of contracting 
parties since it does not require strict rules on saving data in order to decide when an expression of will was 
made. 
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Polish legislators, in response to criticism that a confirmation requirement 
endangered fast and effective trade, adopted lex specialis that eliminated the requirement      
in respect to B2B transactions where professionals are in a long-lasting business 
relationship132.
3. Other formal requirements in a contract formation process
Under Polish law the majority of agreements can be concluded on the Internet, but 
there are many formal requirements that at this stage of technology render electronically 
concluded contracts invalid. For example, if a written form is required a contract has 
legal effect only if an advanced digital signature has been used and it is still not certain 
whether an electronic agent can be assigned one. There is also a group of contracts133 that 
do not become valid if they are not registered with a public authority or a notary.134
Moreover, the Polish legislature adopted information requirements laid down both 
in the EU Directive 97/7 on distance selling and 2000 E-commerce Directive which are 
hard to meet.135 According to the rules merchants are obliged to explain electronic 
contract formation process, in particular, they have to provide the technical means for 
identifying and correcting errors, the languages for concluding a contract, general terms 
and conditions.  Merchants must also inform a customer of the legal effects of the 
confirmation that an offer has been received.136 Furthermore, this information must be 
132 KOCOT, supra note 115, at 113.
133 Polish law distinguishes contracts in simple written form, written form with an authenticated date or 
signature and a notarial deed.  
134 Kryczka, supra note 13.
135 Lodder & Voulon , supra note 7.
136 Civil Code Art. 61¹§ 2.
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submitted in an unambiguous way and the consequence of failing to meet these standards 
would be a consumer’s right to rescind the contract (e.g. on the basis of mistake) or to 
claim damages (e.g. on the basis of breach of pre-contractual duties).137 These 
requirements clearly may delay a wide usage of electronic agents because most websites 
nowadays do not even meet these information requirements and the creators of websites 
do not wish to invest in technology for providing information understandable by 
agents.138
As to the battle of forms, Polish law applies the mirror image rule which means 
that a contract is not concluded if the terms of an offer differ from those of the 
acceptance. In cases where parties use prewritten forms they must be available for the 
other party before the conclusion of a contract, because a failure to comply with this 
requirement results in an invalid agreement.139
 C. Avoidance doctrines
In automated transactions, just as in the U.S., traditional doctrines that can be a 
basis for avoidance are limited since claims such as duress, coerce, lack of awareness or 
lack of free will cannot be applied to electronic agents. Therefore, only mistake, fraud 
and modification of a message by a messenger140 can be taken into account and applied 
per analogiam. 
137 Kryczka, supra note 13.
138 Lodder & Voulon , supra note 7.
139 Id 31.
140 Under Polish law this defect equals to a mistake of a person who employs a messenger. 
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In order to invoke a mistake a party must prove three conditions: that the mistake 
was material so a reasonable person knowing the terms of a contract would not become a 
party, that it referred to the terms of a contract and finally that it was caused by the other 
contracting party.141 Unfortunately, in practice these requirements are hard to meet and in 
most transactions modification of offers will be attributed to technical defects in 
communication rather than to persons using electronic agents.142 In literature, however, it 
is often said that in automated transactions the risk of unintended manifestations of will 
should be higher than in regular contracting and a person using an electronic agent should 
bear the risk.143 Scholars argue that rules on mistake must be modified, because their 
current wording does not allow them to be applied to automated transactions. In this 
situation the legislature may be justified in imposing a three-step procedure for contract 
formation since it gives the parties an opportunity to verify the terms of an agreement and 
prevent possible errors. According to Kocot, a famous scholar, the best solution would be 
to liberalize the rule by replacing a condition that the other party caused the mistake with 
a requirement that the other party had reason to know of or notice an error.144
V. Conclusion
Summing up, both the American and Polish legal systems find contracts 
concluded by electronic agents legally binding. These countries, however, have slightly 
141 Polish Civil Code Art. 84 § 1 and 86 § 1.
142 Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Elektroniczne oswiadczenie woli, [Electronic expression of will] at 
www.centrast.pl/?i=17.
143 So a party using an electronic agent will take a risk of any technical defects, viruses or spywares.  
KOCOT, supra note 115, at 121.
144 Id. 147.
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different approaches to this matter. American law ensures that there are no legal barriers 
to electronic contracts and promotes the use of intelligent agents by adopting liberal rules 
on contract formation. What is significant is that it provides procedures that allow parties 
to avoid the effects of erroneously concluded contracts, whereas the Polish legislature 
adopted a three-step contract formation process so errors do not occur at all. Polish law 
seems a little stiff in comparison to American regulations. In Poland, in theory, there are 
no legal obstacles to the use of electronic agents, but in practice their application is 
considerably limited by the European Union’s regulations on consumer protection. The 
reality is that the technology of intelligent agents is too expensive for individuals while 
the companies that can afford it must conform to high procedural standards applicable to 
professionals. This of course increases the cost of electronic commerce and consequently 
discourages companies from investing in advanced technologies.
In the future, with further progress in artificial intelligence, electronic agents will, 
one hopes, be used on a larger scale. The most promising solution for development is to 
replace the status of electronic agents as mere communication tools with that of legal 
persons. The approach of electronic agents as ePersons would be beneficial for their 
users since right now the biggest concerns are the burdensome consequences of the 
attribution rule. The proposed treatment of intelligent agents as agents under agency law 
did not get a wide approval, but is still considered by many scholars as an option. At this 
point it is too early to say when electronic agents may be granted an independent legal 
status since this depends on the development of artificial intelligence as well as the 
attitude of legislators and courts toward this issue.    
